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OPINION OF THE COURT

FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Fei Mei Cheng (“Cheng”) is a citizen and native of
China. While living in China’s Fujian Province, Cheng became
pregnant but under Chinese law was too young to marry her
boyfriend. Over the course of her pregnancy, local family
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planning officials employed a pattern of escalating threats in an
effort to persuade her to abort the pregnancy, but Cheng resisted
and gave birth to a daughter. In response to her resistance to the
population control laws and to induce her to undergo a
sterilization procedure, the officials confiscated the family farm
and truck, forbade Cheng from working on the farm, threatened
to take her newborn daughter away from her, and imposed
various economic and other sanctions. Cheng was ultimately
forced to have an intrauterine device (“IUD”) inserted, and soon
thereafter, she and her boyfriend fled to the United States. Upon
arrival, she applied for protective relief, invoking 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42), which makes eligible for asylum a “person who has
been forced to . . . undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has
been persecuted for . . . other resistance to a coercive population
control program.”
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied her application and
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed,
concluding, among other things, that Cheng had not been
persecuted and that the mistreatment to which she was subjected
was unrelated to her resistance to China’s population control
policies. We disagree with both of these conclusions and will
therefore grant the petition for review.
I.
A.
The facts underlying Cheng’s asylum application, which
the IJ found credible and which are uncontested, are as follows.
Cheng was born and raised in China’s Fujian Province. Fujian
-3-

Province is “known for being a place where the one-child policy
has been enforced with special vigor—a reputation that persists
still today.” Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 688 (4th Cir. 2008)
(quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). In June 1995,
when she was nineteen years old, Cheng met and started dating
Zailin Chen (“Chen”), a twenty-three-year-old man who lived in
her village. Cheng became pregnant in March 1996. Although
Cheng and Chen wanted to get married, the two were not
permitted to wed because they fell below their village’s age
requirement for marriage—in the village, women were not
permitted to marry before the age of twenty-three, and men were
not allowed to be married before the age of twenty-five.
In May 1996 township officials discovered that Cheng
was pregnant. The officials attempted to pressure Cheng into
having an abortion, but she refused. The official responsible for
birth control and family planning in Cheng’s township, Feng
Ying, then paid a visit to Cheng at her parents’ home, where
Cheng lived. Ying insisted that Cheng have an abortion and
informed her that if she did not terminate her pregnancy, her
reputation would be damaged and she would lose her job.
Again, Cheng refused to comply with these demands.
Approximately one month later, four township officials went to
Cheng’s home to confront her about the pregnancy. Cheng was
not home at the time of the visit, but her mother was, and the
officials warned her mother that if Cheng did not agree to have
an abortion voluntarily, the officials would force her to do so.
As a result of these threats, Cheng and Chen went into
hiding in another city, where they stayed with Chen’s aunt.
While Cheng and Chen were away, township officials returned
-4-

to Cheng’s parents’ house in the middle of the night. The
officials were “furious” when they discovered that Cheng was
not home, and they threatened her parents with seizure of the
family’s farm and truck, which were the source of the family’s
livelihood, if Cheng did not cooperate with the authorities and
have an abortion. (App. at 736.)
Cheng continued to defy the officials’ demands and gave
birth to a daughter on January 1, 1997. When township officials
learned that Cheng had given birth, they immediately followed
through on their threat to confiscate the farm and truck, which
Cheng and her family “depended on . . . to make a living.” (Id.)
In addition, Ying, the leader of the township’s family planning
cadre, went to Cheng’s residence to inform the family that
because Cheng had violated the law by refusing to have an
abortion, the entire family was forbidden from working on the
confiscated farm. Ying also ordered Cheng to participate in a
six-month re-education program.
Finally, the township
government ordered that Cheng and Chen each be sterilized.
Cheng’s family members attempted on multiple occasions to
persuade the officials not to compel the couple to be sterilized,
but the officials rejected their requests. After their family
members’ unsuccessful conversations with township officials,
Chen (whom Cheng characterized as young and temperamental)
engaged in a physical altercation with a government officer and
was detained.
During Chen’s detention, the officials escalated the
pressure on Cheng. They informed her that if she did not
comply with their orders, the government would take her baby
from her, and Chen would be detained for months. If Cheng
-5-

relented, however, they informed her that she could keep the
baby, that Chen would be released, and that the confiscated farm
and truck would be returned to Cheng and her family. To
sweeten the deal, the officials informed Cheng that if she
relented immediately, she would not have to be sterilized, but
instead could have an IUD inserted. “Under such pressure and
out of . . . concern about the fate of [the] new baby and [Chen],”
Cheng acceded to the officials’ orders. (Id. at 738.) As her
declaration indicates, Cheng thought that she could change her
mind and escape the procedure at the last minute, but she was
immediately “dragged” to a minivan and driven to a medical
clinic. (Id.) According to the unopposed statement in Cheng’s
declaration, an IUD is meant to be inserted when a woman is
having her period; because she was not having her period at the
time when she was forced to have the IUD inserted, the
procedure was “very painful” and Cheng “screamed” in pain
when the IUD was inserted. (Id.) After the procedure, she was
required to submit to gynecological examinations every three
months in order to verify the IUD’s presence. She found it
difficult to keep all of these appointments because she had to
work in another city to make ends meet; whenever she missed
an appointment, she was assessed a fine that she could not
afford to pay.
Once her daughter was old enough, Cheng sought to send
her to daycare. The township government informed Cheng that,
because she had disobeyed the family planning laws, her
daughter would not be permitted to attend daycare. She pleaded
with township officials, who ultimately agreed to admit her
daughter but required Cheng to pay twice the regular tuition on
account of her violation of the population control laws.
-6-

Thereafter, township officials learned that one of
Cheng’s neighbors was attempting to have a baby in hiding in
violation of the family planning policy. The officials forced the
neighbor to undergo a sterilization procedure. During the
procedure, Cheng’s neighbor was treated “like a pig”—her
hands and legs were tied, she was not given sufficient
anesthesia, and she screamed throughout the operation. (Id. at
739.) Cheng knew that she would be exposed to the same harm
if she ever attempted to have another child, which she intended
to do. In 2000, she and Chen paid snakeheads to smuggle them
out of China and into the United States.1
B.
Shortly after her arrival in the United States, Cheng was
served with a Notice to Appear and charged with being
removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(1) and
1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). She applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). On November 1, 2005, the IJ convened a hearing at
which Cheng testified to the facts reviewed above. Cheng
further testified that she had given birth to a second child shortly
after entering the United States, and that at the time of her
testimony she was pregnant with a third child. She testified that
she feared that if she were compelled to return to China with
two foreign-born children, she would be sterilized.

1

“A ‘snakehead’ is a professional smuggler of Chinese
migrants.” Lin, 517 F.3d at 687 n.1 (citation omitted).
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The IJ, finding the entirety of Cheng’s testimony
credible, granted her application for asylum. In an oral decision,
the IJ first found that Cheng had not satisfied her burden of
proving that she was the victim of past persecution—the
involuntary insertion of an IUD and the requirement that Cheng
submit to regular gynecological examinations, the IJ concluded,
were insufficiently severe to constitute persecution. Based upon
the fact that Cheng “would return to China having three children
with two of them being unauthorized,” however, the IJ
concluded that there was a reasonable probability that Cheng
would be sterilized—and, therefore, persecuted, see 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)—if she were compelled to return to China. (App.
at 277.) The IJ additionally noted that beyond the risk of
sterilization, Cheng faced the prospect of incurring severe
economic distress as a result of the fines and fees associated
with violating China’s family planning policies. The IJ thus
granted Cheng’s asylum application, but certified the matter to
the BIA in light of the dearth of Board precedent on the issues
raised by the case.
The BIA, in a non-precedential opinion, vacated the IJ’s
order and remanded the case for further proceedings. The BIA
first concluded that mandatory IUD insertion alone does not
bring a person within the definition of “refugee” in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Additionally, the
BIA observed that, following the IJ’s decision in this case, it had
issued two precedential decisions addressing the asylum
applications of persons claiming to have been persecuted
pursuant to China’s one-child policies, which made it
appropriate for the IJ to reconsider the case in light of the recent
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decisions.2 The BIA thus remanded the case to the IJ to address
the impact of the new authority upon Cheng’s asylum
application.
On remand, the IJ denied Cheng’s application. He
explained that it was “curious and troublesome,” (id. at 77), that
the BIA had elected not to address the significance of Cheng’s
resistance to the IUD and the resultant harms she encountered
for purposes of the asylum statute’s “other resistance” prong,3
but he interpreted the Board to have implicitly rejected Cheng’s
argument that she satisfied the “other resistance” criteria.
§ 1101(a)(42). As to whether Cheng had a reasonable fear of
future persecution in the form of sterilization based upon her
past experiences and the fact that she then had three children,

2

In these decisions, the BIA held (1) that a person has
been compelled to undergo an abortion, for purposes of the
asylum statute, when a reasonable person would objectively
view the threat for refusing the abortion to be genuine, and when
the threat, if executed, would itself amount to persecution, see
In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163 (BIA 2007); and (2) that an
asylum applicant who has had a second child in the United
States must have evidence that Chinese nationals with foreignborn children are subject to sterilization in their province of
origin in order to show a reasonable fear of persecution, see In
re C-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 899 (BIA 2006).
3

As we discuss in detail, infra, § 1101(a)(42) makes a
person eligible for asylum if (s)he was persecuted on account of
“other resistance to a coercive population control program.”
-9-

the IJ concluded that the mere fact that Cheng had two foreignborn children was not enough to satisfy her burden of
establishing a likelihood that she would be sterilized if forced to
return to China. The IJ concluded, finally, that Cheng was not
eligible for withholding of removal or CAT relief.
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s order in a single-member, nonprecedential decision. In its decision, the Board relied primarily
upon In re M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 633 (BIA 2008), a
precedential decision issued after the IJ’s second opinion
wherein the BIA held (1) that the insertion of an IUD does not
constitute persecution in and of itself absent aggravating
circumstances, and (2) that the reinsertion of an IUD typically
is not persecution on account of resistance to a family program,
since women in China whose IUDs fall out or are removed
always have the devices reinserted, whether or not they resisted
the family planning program. See id. at 643 (“[B]ecause
reinsertion is a standard procedure in China . . . [reinsertion of
an IUD is] a routine medical procedure that is carried out
regardless of the manner in which the first IUD was removed or
fell out.”).
Applying In re M-F-W- & L-G- to Cheng’s case, the BIA
held that the insertion of Cheng’s IUD did not occur under
sufficiently aggravating circumstances to constitute persecution.
Even if the mandatory use of an IUD were sufficient to
constitute persecution, moreover, the BIA concluded that Cheng
had failed to establish a nexus between the acts complained of
and her resistance to China’s family planning program. As the
BIA explained, “the respondent has offered no basis to show
that the IUD was inserted because of her resistance to China’s
-10-

family policy and not merely as part of a routine medical and
family planning policy.” (App. at 5.) Any economic harms
Cheng experienced as a result of her township officials’ actions,
the Board stated, were not “substantial” enough to warrant a
finding of persecution. (Id.) The BIA thus dismissed Cheng’s
appeal, and she thereafter filed a timely petition for review with
this Court.
II.
“Because the BIA issued an opinion, rather than a
summary affirmance, we review the BIA’s (rather than the IJ’s)
decision.” Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 106
(3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, subject to
the principles of deference articulated in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).”
Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citations omitted). We apply a deferential “substantial
evidence” standard of review to the agency’s factual findings.
McAllister v. Att’y Gen., 444 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2006).
Under this standard, “we may reverse only if a reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2006)
(quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,
481 (1992). However, our deference under this standard “is
expressly conditioned on support in the record,” Toure, 443 F.3d
at 316 (quotation marks and citation omitted), and “[t]he BIA
may not ignore evidence in the record that favors the petitioner.”
Kang v. Att’y Gen., --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 2680752, at *4 (3d
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Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); accord Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446
F.3d 508, 517 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he requirement that the BIA’s
decision be supported by substantial evidence is not an empty
one.”); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 502 F.3d 285, 29091 (3d Cir. 2007).
III.
In 1996, Congress passed and President Clinton signed
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”). Among other things, IIRIRA added
the following language to the then-existing definition of
“refugee” in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”):
[A] person who has been forced to abort a
pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization,
or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal
to undergo such a procedure or for other
resistance to a coercive population control
program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted
on account of political opinion, and a person who
has a well founded fear that he or she will be
forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to
persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance
shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of
persecution on account of political opinion.
Pub. L. No. 104-208, Tit. VI-A, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-546,
3009-689 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). Cheng argues
that being forced to wear an IUD constitutes “sterilization” for
purposes of this statute, and that, alternatively, she was
-12-

persecuted on account of her resistance to China’s coercive
population control program. We review the IIRIRA-modified
provisions of the INA before addressing the merits of Cheng’s
contentions.
A.
The INA gives the Attorney General the discretion to
grant asylum to non-citizens who were persecuted in the country
of their nationality or who have a reasonable fear of persecution
on account of a variety of statutorily enumerated grounds. See 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). The INA does not define the term
“persecution,” but instead orients the asylum provisions around
the definition of the word “refugee.” Prior to 1996, the INA
defined “refugee” in relevant part as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such
person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).4

4

We recently outlined the bases for proving eligibility
for asylum under this provision as follows:
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In 1996, Congress passed IIRIRA, which, among other
things, expanded the INA’s definition of the term “refugee” to
include persons who have been subjected to, or who reasonably
fear being subjected to, persecution as a result of a coercive
population control program. As we recently explained,
Congress amended § 1101(a)(42)(A) “for the express purpose of
overturning the BIA’s decision in Matter of Chang, 20 I. & N.

Under the terms of this provision, [an asylum
applicant] may show that he is eligible for asylum
by proving either that he was previously
persecuted on account of a statutorily enumerated
ground, or that he has a well-founded fear of
future persecution on account of a statutorily
enumerated ground. Persecution includes, but is
not limited to, threats to life, confinement, torture,
and economic restrictions so severe that they
constitute a threat to life or freedom.
Espinosa-Cortez, 607 F.3d at 107 (quotation marks and citations
omitted). An asylum applicant who establishes that (s)he was
previously persecuted on account of a statutorily enumerated
ground is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the applicant
has a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Lukwago v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 174 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
In the absence of such a presumption, the applicant must
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution through
proof of (1) a subjective fear of persecution (2) that is
objectively reasonable. See Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527
F.3d 330, 346 (3d Cir. 2008).
-14-

Dec. 38 (B.I.A 1989).” Lin-Zheng v. Att’y.Gen., 557 F.3d 147,
151 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation omitted). In Chang, the
BIA determined that it could not conclude “that implementation
of the ‘one couple, one child’ policy in and of itself, even to the
extent that involuntary sterilizations may occur, is persecution
or creates a well-founded fear of persecution ‘on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.’” 20 I. & N. Dec. at 44. The BIA
reasoned that China’s family planning policies were “solely tied
to controlling population” and were not “a guise for acting
against people for reasons protected by the Act,” meaning that
a person subjected to such policies could not be considered a
victim of persecution. Id.
Congress concluded that this reasoning was “unduly
restrictive,” and expanded the definition of “refugee” to include
certain victims of persecution related to coercive family
planning and population control policies. H.R. Rep. No.
104-469(I), at 174 (1996). Congressman Christopher H. Smith
succinctly summarized the expanded definition of “refugee” by
explaining that “[f]orced abortion, forced sterilization, and other
severe punishments inflicted on resisters to . . . [China’s
population control] program are persecution on account of
political opinion.” 142 Cong. Rec. H2589-01 (daily ed. Mar. 21,
1996) (comments of Rep. Smith).
As the BIA has since explained, the IIRIRA-amended
definition of “refugee” creates four new categories of refugees
who are eligible for asylum: (1) “person[s] who ha[ve] been
forced to abort a pregnancy,” (2) “person[s] who ha[ve] been
forced . . . to undergo involuntary sterilization,” (3) “person[s]
-15-

. . . who ha[ve] been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo
such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population
control program,” and (4) “person[s] who ha[ve] . . . a well
founded fear that [they] will be forced to undergo such a
procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or
resistance.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also In re M-F-W& L-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 635. “The first and second
categories of aliens are ‘deemed’ by section 601(a) of the
IIRIRA to be refugees,” In re M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
at 635—that is, under the plain language of the statute, a person
who has been forced to undergo either an abortion or
sterilization pursuant to a coercive population control program
is automatically eligible for asylum. The third and fourth
categories make asylum available to an immigrant who has not
undergone compelled abortion or sterilization if the applicant
can show past persecution for failing or refusing to undergo
such a procedure or for otherwise resisting the population
control program, or a well-founded fear of abortion,
sterilization, or persecution on account of such failure, refusal,
or resistance.
Cheng argues that she is eligible for asylum under the
second, third, and fourth categories. She contends that being
forced to wear an IUD is tantamount to sterilization, and that
even if it were not, she was previously persecuted and has a
well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her
resistance to China’s coercive population control policies. We
consider these contentions in turn.

-16-

B.
As we noted above, under the plain language of the INA,
if a non-citizen has been compelled to undergo an abortion or
sterilization procedure, she is “deemed” to have been persecuted
on account of political opinion and need not present evidence of
the persecutor’s motive. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Cheng
argues that being compelled to wear an IUD and being forced to
submit to regular gynecological examinations constitutes
sterilization because it inhibits a woman’s capacity to reproduce
for as long as the IUD remains in place. That is, because under
China’s population control policies the IUD is to remain in place
throughout a woman’s reproductive life, Cheng argues that
forced IUD insertion is tantamount to sterilization and is
therefore per se persecution under the INA. See id. The BIA,
interpreting the term “sterilization” in § 1101(a)(42)(A), has
held otherwise, concluding that being forced to wear an IUD is
different in kind from being forced to undergo a sterilization
procedure. See In re M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 636.
For the following reasons, we conclude that the BIA’s
interpretation of the statutory term “sterilization” is entitled to
deference and that Cheng’s IUD-insertion-is-sterilization
argument is unavailing.5

5

We are unpersuaded by the Respondent’s suggestion
that we lack jurisdiction to consider this issue because it was not
raised before the BIA. The Respondent is correct that an
immigrant must “raise or exhaust his or her remedies as to each
claim or ground for relief [before the BIA] if he or she is to
preserve the right of judicial review of that claim,” and that this
-17-

In its recent precedential opinion, In re M-F-W- & L-G-,
the BIA explained that although “[o]ne could argue that the
perpetual use of an IUD, or any other birth control method,
throughout a woman’s child bearing years until menopause
effectively results in a form of sterilization,” the plain language
and legislative history of the statute indicated that forced IUD

waiver rule is jurisdictional. Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157,
159 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
However, while Cheng did not argue this issue when her appeal
was before the BIA for the second time, her initial brief to the
BIA (when the IJ certified the case to the Board) certainly can
be read to raise this issue. In particular, Cheng argued in her
initial brief that “[o]ne of the key issues presented for the
Board’s determination is whether the forced IUD insertion and
gynecological exams are sufficient in itself [sic] for a finding of
past persecution,” and the Board addressed (and rejected) this
argument in its first opinion. (App. at 194, 201 (emphasis
added).) We have explained that “so long as an immigration
petitioner makes some effort, however insufficient, to place the
Board on notice of a straightforward issue being raised on
appeal, a petitioner is deemed to have exhausted her
administrative remedies,” and Cheng’s initial submission is
more than sufficient to satisfy this undemanding standard. Lin
v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Joseph
v. Att’y Gen., 465 F.3d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 2006)). Nor was
Cheng required to reargue the issue before the Board after the
IJ’s second decision, given that the Board already had the
opportunity to address the issue in the first instance. See Popal
v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2005).
-18-

insertion was not per se persecution. Id. The BIA looked first
to the statutory language, reasoning as follows:
[T]he verb to “sterilize” is defined as “to make
sterile,” which means “[i]ncapable of sexual
reproduction.” Webster’s II New Riverside
University Dictionary 1137 (1994). This
definition makes clear the permanency of the
sterilization procedure—i.e., that it leaves one
incapable of having children—and leads us to
reject the argument that IUD use should be treated
as the equivalent of sterilization.
Id. The BIA explained that an IUD is “a method of birth
control” that, in contrast with the permanency of sterilization, is
“a temporary measure meant to provide for birth planning and
not to remove all possibility of future birth opportunities.” Id.
(emphasis omitted). The Board confirmed its construction of
the statutory language by looking to IIRIRA’s legislative
history. As the Board explained, “Congress was clearly aware
of China’s use of IUDs as a birth control method separate from
sterilization because both terms were used in describing China’s
family planning policy.” Id. (citation omitted). If Congress had
intended to include forced IUD insertion among the bases for
per se refugee status (as it did with abortion and sterilization),
the BIA reasoned, then it could have done so expressly. See id.
“It is harm of [the] magnitude and permanency [of abortion and
sterilization] that Congress treated as automatically amounting
to qualifying persecution.” Id. at 641.
Our analysis of whether or not to defer to In re M-F-W-19-

& L-G-—a precedential opinion of the BIA interpreting the
statute that the agency is charged to implement—is governed by
the familiar two-step inquiry of Chevron. See, e.g., Kaplun, 602
F.3d at 265. First, we assess “whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.” Ndayshimiye v. Att’y
Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Chevron, 467
U.S. at 842). If the plain meaning of the statute is unambiguous,
then the statutory text controls, and no deference to the agency’s
interpretation of that text is called for. See Chang v. I.N.S., 119
F.3d 1055, 1060 (3d Cir. 1997). If, however, “by employing
traditional tools of statutory construction” we are unable to
arrive at an unambiguous reading of the statutory language, Lee
v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks
and citation omitted), then “we proceed to the second step and
determine whether the BIA’s reading of the provision is a
reasonable one.” Ndayshimiye, 557 F.3d at 129 (citation
omitted). If the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, “we must
let the interpretation stand.” Id. To determine that the Board
has reasonably construed the statute, we “need not conclude that
the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could
have adopted . . . or even the reading the court would have
reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial
proceeding.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11 (citations omitted);
see also Chang, 119 F.3d at 1060 (“[W]e will not substitute our
own judgment for that of the BIA, but we must also reject any
interpretation by the BIA that is ‘arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.’” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 844)).
Turning to the first step of the inquiry, we must
determine whether or not “Congress has directly spoken to the
-20-

precise question at issue,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842—that
question being whether § 1101(a)(42)’s use of the term
“involuntary sterilization” encompasses compelled lifelong IUD
usage. Cheng argues that the term “involuntary sterilization”
unambiguously includes forced IUD insertion, contending that
women who have been compelled to wear IUDs have undergone
“an involuntary procedure which leaves them incapable of
sexual reproduction.” (Pet’r Br. 31.) According to Cheng, the
fact that Congress did not specify any particular type of
sterilization procedure (such as tubal ligation, vasectomy, or
hysterectomy) indicates that Congress meant for the term
“sterilization” to encompass any procedure that renders a person
incapable of reproduction, including forced IUD insertion.
Because under China’s population control program, compelled
IUD usage is accompanied by regular gynecological
examinations to monitor the continued presence of the device,
Cheng argues that forced IUD insertion leaves a woman
permanently incapable of reproduction and thus is
unambiguously a form of sterilization.
We cannot agree with Cheng that “Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question” of whether sterilization
encompasses the compelled use of a birth control device like an
IUD. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. As the BIA reasoned in In re
M-F-W- & L-G-, the plain meaning of the word “sterilization”
does not unambiguously encompass temporary methods of
inhibiting a person’s reproduction such as the forced use of
IUDs and other birth control devices. Webster’s defines the
word “sterilization” as “a procedure by which a human or other
animal is made incapable of reproduction— compare
CASTRATION, SPAYING.” Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary
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2238 (3d ed. 1993). On its face, “sterilization” appears to
include only procedures that permanently eliminate a person’s
reproductive capacity, as the dictionary references to such
permanent and irreversible procedures as castration and spaying,
and the use of the phrase “made incapable,” make clear. Id.; see
Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 622 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(“Sterilization is . . . permanent[] and irreparable.”); Robinson
v. Parrish, 720 F.2d 1548, 1550 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)
(“[S]terilization . . . [is a procedure that results in] the permanent
inability to have children.”) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
The forced insertion of an IUD certainly does not fall
unambiguously within this category, since an IUD can be
removed and its effect upon a woman’s reproductive capacity
eliminated.6 Cheng attempts to undermine this distinction by

6

Indeed, taken to its extreme, Cheng’s attempt to read
the permanency out of “sterilization” would lead to such bizarre
propositions as considering the use of any contraceptive (such
as a condom) to be “sterilization,” since all contraceptives
inhibit reproduction. At the risk of stating the obvious, the use
of a contraceptive ordinarily would not amount to sterilization,
since “[s]terilization is . . . permanent[] and irreparable” and the
use of a contraceptive—even an IUD, which is designed to
remain in place until removed by a physician—is not. Gerber,
291 F.3d at 622. Although the question of whether monitored,
lifelong use of an IUD can be considered sterilization (because
it is, in effect, a permanent or semi-permanent form of
contraception) presents a closer call, under Chevron, close calls
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noting that it is possible (although very difficult) to undo certain
sterilization procedures, such as tubal ligation, and that the
permanence of IUD insertion in China is all but guaranteed by
the requirement of regular gynecological examinations. At
most, however, Cheng’s argument suggests that the term
“sterilization” is ambiguous when applied at the margins to such
non-obvious examples as semi-permanent and monitored IUD
insertions, and when a statutory provision is ambiguous,
Chevron dictates that we defer to the agency’s reasonable
construction of that provision. See, e.g., Ndayshimiye, 557 F.3d
at 129.
We conclude that the term “involuntary sterilization” by
definition contemplates a permanent inhibition of reproductive
capacity, and we find that Congress has not directly spoken to
the precise question of whether compelled IUD insertion, plus
monitoring, falls within the ambit of the statutory term. See
Huang v. Holder, 591 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding
at the first step of the Chevron analysis that “Congress has not
determined whether . . . an IUD insertion constitutes
sterilization”).
Turning to the second step of the Chevron analysis, we
further conclude that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute is
reasonable and entitled to deference. An agency’s interpretation
of the statute it is charged with administering is entitled to
deference if it “represents a reasonable accommodation of

resolving ambiguous statutory terms may be for the agency, not
the court, to decide.
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conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by
the statute . . . unless it appears from the statute or its legislative
history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would
have sanctioned.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (quoting United
States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
Here, the Board’s decision that forced IUD insertion is
insufficiently permanent to constitute sterilization is not only a
permissible construction of the statute’s terms, but it also finds
support in the legislative history of IIRIRA. As the BIA
reasoned, the legislative history of IIRIRA reflects an
understanding that sterilization and birth control methods (such
as IUDs) are distinct means of inhibiting population growth.
See In re M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 636 (“Congress
was clearly aware of China’s use of IUDs as a birth control
method separate from sterilization because both terms were used
in describing China’s family planning policy.” (citation
omitted)).
For example, testimony before the House
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights
catalogued the number of sterilizations, IUD insertions, and
abortions in a given year, suggesting that sterilizations and IUD
insertions are categorically distinct means of enforcing a
population control program. See Coercive Population Control
in China: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations
and Human Rights of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 104th
Cong. 8 (1995). Cheng has identified no contrary authority
suggesting that Congress equated forced IUD insertion with
sterilization.
In sum, we conclude that the BIA’s construction of the
statute is reasonable and entitled to deference. See Huang, 591
-24-

F.3d at 129-30 (“Under step two, we conclude that the BIA’s
conclusion that an involuntary IUD insertion is not an
involuntary sterilization is permissible. The BIA’s reasoning
that sterilization makes one permanently incapable of having
children, whereas an IUD is a temporary measure, is
reasonable.”). We thus reject Cheng’s contention that IUD
insertion is tantamount to sterilization.
C.
The fact that IUD insertion is not equivalent to
sterilization does not affect the remainder of Cheng’s argument,
which focuses on her more persuasive contention that she was
persecuted, not sterilized. In particular, Cheng argues that she
qualifies for asylum under § 1101(a)(42)’s prong authorizing the
Attorney General to grant asylum to a non-citizen who was
persecuted on account of the asylum applicant’s “other
resistance to a coercive population control program.” We
review the BIA’s approach to “other resistance” claims, and
explain why the Board’s decision in this case is not supported by
substantial evidence, in turn below.
1.
We have not, to date, had occasion to address the “other
resistance” provision of § 1101(a)(42) in significant detail,7 and

7

In Li v. Attorney General, 400 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir.
2005), we held that the petitioner had been subjected to
economic persecution on account of his resistance to China’s
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indeed, very few courts have decided cases based upon the
“other resistance” language.8 The BIA, however, discussed the
provision in depth in In re M-F-W- & L-G- (the same 2008
decision, discussed supra, in which the Board held that forced
IUD insertion is not tantamount to sterilization). In that case,
the petitioner’s other resistance claim was based upon the fact
that she removed an IUD that had been inserted after the birth of
her first child; when the authorities discovered that the IUD had
been removed, they took the petitioner to have an IUD
reinserted after detaining her for three days. 24 I. & N. Dec. at

family planning policies, but our focus in that case was upon
whether the petitioner had shown past economic persecution, not
on the requirements for establishing an “other resistance”
persecution claim.
8

No court appears to have decided an “other resistance”
case since the BIA decided In re M-F-W- & L-G-. Before the
BIA’s decision in that case, the most in-depth treatment of the
“other resistance” language was the Ninth Circuit’s en banc
decision in Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2004),
which held that where “a young woman who announced her
opposition to government population control policies and is
thereafter subjected to a forced gynecological exam and
threatened with future abortion, sterilization of her boyfriend,
and arrest,” persecution on account of “other resistance” has
been established. The Ninth Circuit emphasized the “crude and
aggressive” and “rape-like” nature of the examination procedure
in concluding that the petitioner had been persecuted on account
of her resistance to the family planning laws. Id. at 1158 & n.4.
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634-35.
Evaluating the petitioner’s claim that she qualified for
asylum based upon her resistance to the family planning
policies, the BIA explained that, unlike persons who have been
subjected to forced abortion or sterilization, who under the
statute have per se been subjected to persecution on account of
political opinion, see § 1101(a)(42), a person claiming to have
been persecuted due to her resistance to a population control
policy must still prove that she was persecuted and that the
persecution was on account of such resistance. Specifically, the
Board held that in order to proceed under the “other resistance”
provision, the asylum applicant must prove that “(1) she resisted
China’s family planning policy, (2) she has been persecuted (or
has a well-founded fear of persecution), and (3) the persecution
was or would be because of the respondent’s resistance to the
policy.” In re M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 637 (citation
omitted).
The BIA interpreted the first of these
prongs—resistance—broadly, explaining that acts such as
removing an IUD or refusing to attend a gynecological
appointment satisfy the statutory element of resistance “because
such acts, while arguably not comprising active or forceful
opposition to China’s family planning policy, would certainly
thwart the goals of the plan and be viewed with disfavor by
Chinese officials implementing the plan.” Id. at 638. By
contrast, the BIA explained that “simple grudging compliance”
with the population control program would not amount to
resistance. Id.
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As to the second prong—persecution—the Board
explained that “the words ‘persecuted’ and ‘persecution’ in [the
IIRIRA-modified language within the INA’s definition of
‘refugee’] derive their meaning from the standard use of these
terms in contexts other than those related to population control.
They do not enjoy some special separate meaning within the
context of [population control] cases.” Id. at 639. Assessing
whether compelled IUD insertion in and of itself is persecutory,
the Board noted that although the involuntary insertion of an
IUD is intrusive, the procedure is typically painless and its
effects are temporary. The Board explained:
[S]imply requiring a woman to use an IUD, and
other more routine methods of China’s
implementation of its family planning policy, do
not generally rise to the level of harm required to
establish persecution . . . . [E]xamples of routine
acts implementing China’s family planning policy
that are lacking in harm sufficient to constitute
persecution include reinsertion of an IUD after
the removal of an IUD, fines for having removed
the IUD that are not excessive, regularly required
gynecological exams, and other routine fines and
threats for disobeying the policy.
Id. at 640-41 (citations omitted). The BIA made clear that
having an IUD inserted could amount to persecution in some
situations, but it explained that in order “to rise to the level of
harm necessary to constitute ‘persecution,’ the insertion of an
IUD must involve aggravating circumstances.” Id. at 642. The
Board did not elaborate upon the circumstances that would be
-28-

sufficiently aggravating to make forced IUD insertion
persecutory in and of itself.
Finally, the BIA explained that there must be a nexus
between the persecution and the person’s resistance to the
population control program in order for a non-citizen to qualify
for asylum, and that in the context of IUD insertion, this nexus
may be difficult to establish. See id. at 642-43. The Board
reasoned:
The question raised here and in many “other
resistance” cases is whether the reinsertion of an
IUD was because of the alien’s resistance to the
insertion of the first IUD, or because of its
removal, or merely because reinsertion is a
standard procedure in China. If the latter, an alien
may be unable to meet her burden of establishing
that the IUD insertion was “for,” or because of,
her resistance to China’s policies. Rather, it
would then be a routine medical procedure that is
carried out regardless of the manner in which the
first IUD was removed or fell out. This would not
be sufficient to establish the nexus required under
section 101(a)(42) of the Act.
Id. at 643. The Board concluded that the petitioner had merely
experienced the routine implementation of China’s family
planning policy; the forced insertion of an IUD in that case was
insufficiently harmful to constitute persecution and was not
related to the petitioner’s resistance to the policy. See id. at 644.
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2.
Applying the framework of In re M-F-W- & L-G- to this
case, the BIA, in a single-member, non-precedential decision,
concluded that Cheng failed to demonstrate that she had been
persecuted or that she had a reasonable fear of future
persecution on account of her resistance to China’s population
control policies. With regard to the resistance prong, the Board
appears to have assumed that Cheng’s conduct amounted to
resistance to the one-child policy. The BIA concluded,
however, that Cheng did not satisfy the persecution or nexus
prongs. As we now explain, we agree with Cheng that the
Board’s analysis of both the persecution and nexus prongs is not
supported by substantial evidence, and we therefore grant the
petition for review.
a. Resistance
As an initial point, there can be no doubt that Cheng
resisted China’s population control policies (and, as we have
noted, the Board assumed as much). In In re M-F-W- & L-G-,
the BIA explained that actions that “thwart the goals of the
[population control] plan and [are] viewed with disfavor by
Chinese officials implementing the plan” constitute “resistance”
under § 1101(a)(42), even if the actions are not “forceful.” 24
I. & N. Dec. at 638. Cheng repeatedly refused to comply with
multiple officials’ increasingly strenuous demands that she abort
her first pregnancy, provoking “fur[y],” escalating threats, and
various enforcement actions on the part of the officials. (App.
at 736.) Cheng fled the township to have her baby, defied
orders that she undergo a sterilization procedure, had to be
-30-

dragged to the clinic to have the IUD inserted, and missed
multiple gynecological appointments.
Her actions were
significantly more defiant of China’s family planning policies
than were the more limited actions held to constitute resistance
in In re M-F-W- & L-G-.
Although the Government did not make the point in its
brief, at oral argument, it appeared for the first time to suggest
that Cheng’s resistance to the officials’ demands that she
undergo an abortion was not “resistance to a coercive population
control program” within the meaning of the INA because Cheng
was unmarried at the time when her acts of resistance transpired.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). The Government argues that China’s
laws forbidding unmarried couples from procreating are not part
of a “population control program,” but are instead aimed at
preventing people from having illegitimate children, and so
Cheng’s resistance was to China’s illegitimacy laws, not its
population control laws. Id.
We reject this singularly unpersuasive contention. The
Country Report prepared by the State Department addresses
asylum claims based upon China’s National Marriage Law
(which proscribes procreation by unmarried couples) under the
umbrella of “claims based on population policies” and “claims
based on coercive family planning.” 9
(App. at 442

9

We have recognized that such reports are “the most
appropriate and perhaps the best resource for information on
political situations in foreign nations.” McAllister, 444 F.3d at
189 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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(capitalization omitted, emphasis added).) The Report thus
indicates that the restriction on procreation by unmarried
couples is a component of China’s population control regime,
and the Government has identified no evidence supporting a
contrary conclusion.10 Moreover, the Report’s treatment of the
National Marriage Law as part and parcel of the population
control program is eminently sensible. China’s one-child-percouple policy is well-known, (id. at 443), and it would obviously
undermine the population control program if married Chinese
couples were held to a one-child limit but unmarried couples
could procreate without restriction. In sum, China’s prohibition
on procreation by unmarried couples is undeniably part of the
population control program, and the uncontradicted evidence
conclusively establishes that Cheng resisted that program.11

10

Indeed, the Government’s own brief likewise treats the
National Marriage Law as a component of China’s population
control program, notwithstanding its contention at oral argument
that the ban on procreation by unmarried couples is not part of
the population control policy. (Resp’t Br. 24.)
11

Our concurring colleague takes issue with the BIA’s
broad interpretation of the resistance prong and would hold that
the phrase “resistance to a coercive population control program”
should be restricted “to resistence only to abortion or
sterilization procedures, not to resistence to any method of
population control.” (Concurring Op. at 1.) The principles of
Chevron deference and the language of § 1101(a)(42) compel us
to disagree. Because the text of § 1101(a)(42) does not clearly
and unambiguously indicate that Congress intended the phrase
-32-

b. Persecution
With respect to whether she was persecuted, Cheng
argues that the Board gave little or no consideration to the
circumstances that distinguish her case from the mill-run IUD
insertion case. In effect, Cheng contends that in focusing on the
IUD insertion itself without looking at the pattern of
mistreatment within which it occurred, the Board missed the
forest (the persecution) for the trees (the IUD insertion). For the
following reasons, we agree that the Board’s conclusory
statement that Cheng “has not shown aggravating

“coercive population control program” to include only abortion
and sterilization, the BIA’s reasonable interpretation of the
provision as encompassing methods of population control other
than abortion and sterilization, such as the forced insertion of
IUDs, is entitled to deference under Chevron. See Chang, 119
F.3d at 1060. Further, as the concurring opinion itself
recognizes, courts—including this Court—have routinely
interpreted the phrase “resistance to a coercive population
control program” to extend beyond acts of resistance to abortion
and sterilization alone. See, e.g., Huang v. Att’y General, --F.3d ----, 2010 WL 3489543, at *5 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (observing
in dicta that “[m]andatory birth-control measures short of
abortion or sterilization, such as insertion of an IUD or required
gynecological screenings . . . . qualify as a ‘coercive population
control program’”); Li, 400 F.3d at 159 (having four children in
violation of the one-child policy is resistance to population
control regime); Li, 356 F.3d at 1156 (declaring intent to have
multiple children is resistance to population control program).
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circumstances” is not supported by substantial evidence.12 (Id.
at 11.) In our view, the Board may not, in determining whether
an asylum applicant suffered past persecution, take a single
instance of mistreatment (here, the IUD insertion) from a larger
pattern of abuse and confine its persecution analysis to the
question of whether that single instance was, in and of itself,
persecutory.
Instead, “[i]ncidents alleged to constitute
persecution . . . must be considered cumulatively.”
Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 283 (2d Cir. 2006)
(Sotomayor, J.) (citations omitted).
Persecution, we have made clear, “is an extreme concept
that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards
as offensive.” Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 191 (3d
Cir. 2007) (quoting Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir.
1993)); accord Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 341

12

The Government does not appear to suggest that the
Board’s treatment of the persecution issue was in fact adequate.
Instead, the Government contends that the BIA “presumed
without deciding” that Cheng was persecuted and rested its
holding exclusively on the nexus prong. (Resp’t Br. 21.) The
Government misreads the BIA’s decision. After discussing the
nexus issue, the BIA stated that Cheng “also has not shown
aggravating circumstances” and that she failed “to demonstrate
the substantial economic disadvantage necessary for . . . a
finding of persecution.” (App. at 5 (emphasis added).)
Although it did so in terms that might generously be described
as succinct, the Board did purport to resolve the persecution
issue.
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(3d Cir. 2008) (stating that persecution does not encompass
“every act that our society might regard as unfair, unjust,
unlawful, or unconstitutional”). Our oft-quoted, non-exclusive
list of examples of persecution “include[s] threats to life,
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that
they constitute a threat to life or freedom.” Fatin, 12 F.3d at
1240. But while the concept of persecution is “extreme,” id. at
1243, it is not an impossible standard to satisfy. The BIA,
relying upon the legislative history of the INA, has emphasized
that “[t]he harm or suffering need not [only] be physical, but
may take other forms, such as the deliberate imposition of
severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty,
food, housing, employment or other essentials of life,” and that,
with regard to the non-physical aspects of persecution, an
applicant “need not demonstrate a total deprivation of livelihood
or a total withdrawal of all economic opportunity in order to
demonstrate harm amounting to persecution.” In re T-Z, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 163, 171, 173 (BIA 2007) (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
95-1452, at 5 (1978)); accord Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157,
169 (3d Cir. 2005); see also I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428
n.22 (1984) (explaining that persecution is a “broader concept
than threats to life or freedom”); Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1036;
Chanchavac v. I.N.S., 207 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 2000);
Marquez v. I.N.S., 105 F.3d 374, 379 (7th Cir. 1997).
Moreover, in determining whether actual or threatened
mistreatment amounts to persecution, “[t]he cumulative effect
of the applicant’s experience must be taken into account”
because “[t]aking isolated incidents out of context may be
misleading.” Manzur v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281,
290 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted);
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accord Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 343 (explaining that we do
not evaluate incidents in a vacuum, but instead must examine
them “in the context of the . . . overall trajectory” of
mistreatment); Toure, 443 F.3d at 318 (assessing events
underlying persecution claim “[i]n the aggregate” (citation
omitted)); Li, 400 F.3d at 169 (same); Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at
1036; In re O-Z- & I-Z; 22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 25-26 (BIA 1998).
Even if one incident of mistreatment is not, in and of
itself, severe enough to constitute persecution, a series of
incidents of physical or economic mistreatment could, taken
together, be sufficiently abusive to amount to persecution. See
Edimo-Doualla, 464 F.3d at 283. “Where no single incident
stands out above the others, sometimes a small incident may be
‘the last straw’; and although no single incident may be
sufficient, all the incidents related by the applicant taken
together, could make [the applicant’s] fear ‘well-founded.’”
Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees ¶ 201 (Geneva 1992)).13
In this case, the Board stated that, beyond the insertion of

13

The Supreme Court has noted that the Handbook
quoted in Poradisova “provides significant guidance in
construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform,”
even though the Handbook is not binding authority. I.N.S. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987).
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an IUD, Cheng “has not shown aggravating circumstances.”
(App. at 5.) In reaching this conclusion, however, the Board did
not take into account many of the acts of mistreatment
unequivocally established by Cheng’s uncontradicted evidence.
First, the Board failed to consider some of the most serious
threats levelled at Cheng, including the officials’ statement that
they would take her daughter from her and their threat to detain
her boyfriend for months if she did not comply with their
demand that she undergo a sterilization procedure. These
threats are unquestionably relevant to the question of whether
Cheng experienced past persecution (and whether she has a
reasonable fear of future persecution). Cf. Ngengwe, 543 F.3d
at 1037 (explaining that “[t]he IJ did not consider Ngengwe’s
argument that her in-laws . . . threatened to take her children,”
a fact that is material to the assessment of “whether non-physical
persecution occurred”). The threats are, we note, especially
important in light of the fact that individual instances of
mistreatment must be assessed within the “overall trajectory of
the harassment,” which in this case, as the fulfillment of the
threat to take Cheng’s farm demonstrates, is one of escalating
and consummated threats. Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 343
(further explaining that “[w]eighing this final incident in the
context of the prior incidents shows that Petitioner’s allegations
regarding the imminence and menacing nature of the [earlier]
threats are justified”); accord Manzur, 494 F.3d at 290;
Edimo-Doualla, 464 F.3d at 283.
Moreover, the Board did not mention Cheng’s testimony,
found credible by the IJ, that the IUD insertion procedure was
performed in a hurried and improper manner that caused her
extreme pain. This fact is significant to the persecution analysis
-37-

because the BIA’s conclusion in In re M-F-W- & L-G- that an
IUD insertion did not itself constitute persecution rested in no
small part upon its understanding that IUD insertion “typically
does not cause substantial pain or lasting side effects.” 24 I. &
N. Dec. at 641 (citation omitted); see Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d
171, 179 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining, pre-In re M-F-W- & L-G,
that IUD insertion could constitute persecution if the “manner
or means” of insertion were harsh or atypical or if the procedure
were accompanied by “force, physical abuse, or other equivalent
circumstances”).
Finally, and most importantly, the Board did not
adequately address the significance of the financial hardships
imposed upon Cheng in direct response to her resistance to the
family planning officials’ orders. We have been clear that
“economic deprivation, if sufficiently severe, can constitute
persecution within the meaning of asylum law.” Li, 400 F.3d at
159. In Li, for example, the petitioner was fined the equivalent
of twenty months’ salary, was blacklisted from government
employment, and had various household items confiscated on
account of his resistance to China’s one-child policy. See id. Li
was, however, able to get by with “some temporary jobs.” Id. at
160 (quotation marks omitted). We explained that although
“Li’s family did not reach near-starvation levels, we can fairly
say that the economic restrictions allegedly faced by the Li
family were ‘severe’ . . . . [because for] a relatively poor family[,
such hardships] . . . could threaten [their] freedom if not their
lives.” Id. at 169. We emphasized that the economic
deprivations visited upon Li were “deliberately imposed as a
form of punishment because of his violation of China’s
population control policy, rather than being the result of
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‘natural’ economic downturns or generally harsh conditions
shared by others in China.” Id.; accord Boykov v. I.N.S., 109
F.3d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the “economic
harm required . . . [to show persecution] must be deliberately
imposed as a form of punishment” (quotation marks, citations,
and some alterations omitted)). We held, in short, that when an
economic sanction is sufficiently severe, and where it is
deliberately imposed by the government as punishment,
economic persecution may be established. See Li, 400 F.3d at
169.
We are not alone in recognizing that severe economic
sanctions constitute persecution within the meaning of the INA,
see, e.g., Ahmed v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 2006),
and the BIA itself previously reached the same conclusion,
emphasizing that Congress intended the concept of persecution
to reach not only physical harm, but also “deprivation[s] of
liberty, food, housing, employment or other essentials of life.”
In re T-Z, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 171 (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
95-1452, at 5 (emphasis omitted)). Indeed, consideration of the
economic aspects of persecution in the context of China’s
coercive population control measures is especially appropriate
in light of the legislative history of IIRIRA. Both the House and
Senate Reports for IIRIRA recognized that “[c]ouples with
unauthorized children are subjected to excessive fines, and
sometimes their homes and possessions are destroyed,” and
emphasized that “[t]he United States should not deny protection
to persons subjected to such treatment.” H.R. Rep. No.
104-469(I), at 174; see also S. Rep. No. 104-95, at 92 (1995).
Cheng’s uncontested and credible evidence shows that
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she was subjected to such treatment. After Cheng refused to
comply with the officials’ orders that she have an abortion, local
government officials confiscated her family farm and truck, and
forbade the entire family from working on the farm. Cheng’s
credible testimony made unmistakably clear the devastating
impact that such a deprivation imposed upon her and her
family—she stated in no uncertain terms that the family
“depended on the farm to make a living,” a fact that the IJ
appears to have credited when describing the “serious” impact
that even a modest fine would have on a family of the Chengs’
limited means.14 (App. at 76, 736.)
The BIA’s discussion of Cheng’s economic persecution
was limited to its statement that Cheng “has failed to
demonstrate the substantial economic disadvantage necessary
for such a finding of persecution.” (Id. at 5.) This statement is
not supported by substantial evidence. The imposition of
“modest fines” is, of course, insufficient to rise to the level of
persecution. Huang v. I.N.S., 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005)
(per curiam); accord In re M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at
641 (explaining that “fines . . . that are not excessive” do not
amount to persecution). But “an extraordinarily severe fine or
wholesale seizure of assets may be so severe as to amount to

14

We do not overlook the fact that, as in Li, Cheng was
able to “get by” with a job she located in another city. Li, 400
F.3d at 167. We and the BIA have recognized that an asylum
applicant need not necessarily “reach near-starvation levels” in
order for severe economic sanctions to constitute persecution.
Id. at 169; accord In re T-Z, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 171.
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persecution, even though the basic necessities of life might still
be attainable.” In re T-Z, 24 I. & N. at 171 (citation omitted);
accord Li, 400 F.3d at 169. A wholesale seizure of assets is
precisely what occurred here, as the uncontradicted facts
credited by the IJ clearly establish. Surely the seizure of
property as significant as the family farm and truck, when those
very assets served as the exclusive source of the family’s
livelihood, (App. at 736), constitutes a severe economic sanction
that “could threaten [the] family’s freedom if not their lives.”
Li, 400 F.3d at 169. And, as was the case in Li, there can be no
doubt that Cheng’s financial hardship was imposed as a sanction
and was not the product of natural shifts in economic conditions;
as in Li, the confiscation of the farm was “imposed as a form of
punishment because of [Cheng’s] violation of China’s
population control policy.” Id.
We conclude, in sum, that the BIA’s analysis of past
persecution, which failed to consider credible evidence of past
persecution in Cheng’s case and did not address the impact of
the severe economic sanctions imposed upon Cheng, is not
supported by substantial evidence. See Espinosa-Cortez, 607
F.3d at 113-14 (“An applicant for asylum is entitled to a
reasoned analysis, not one which wholly disregards relevant,
probative evidence.” (quoting Mema v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 412,
419 (7th Cir. 2007))); accord Kang, 2010 WL 2680752, at *4.
It is clear that by focusing exclusively on the forced insertion of
an IUD to the exclusion of all other evidence of mistreatment,
the BIA failed to consider “[t]he cumulative effect of [Cheng’s]
experience.” Manzur, 494 F.3d at 290. We agree with Cheng
that when considered “[i]n the aggregate,” Toure, 443 F.3d at
318, the mistreatment she experienced—including the
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confiscation of the farm and truck upon which her family’s
livelihood depended, the threat to take her daughter from her
and continue to detain her boyfriend, the forced insertion of an
IUD under circumstances that caused intense physical pain, and
the imposition of fines for having an unauthorized child and for
missing gynecological appointments—compels the conclusion
that she suffered past persecution.
c. Nexus
Finally, we agree with Cheng that the BIA’s conclusion
that there was no nexus between her acts of resistance and the
mistreatment visited upon her is not supported by substantial
evidence. The BIA’s analysis of this issue was brief—it
explained, citing In re M-F-W- & L-G-, that “where the
insertion or reinsertion of an IUD is carried out as part of a
routine medical procedure, an alien will have difficulty showing
the required nexus, i.e., that the procedure was . . . because of
her resistance to China’s family planning policy.” (App. at 4.)
The BIA concluded that Cheng “offered no basis to show that
the IUD was inserted because of her resistance to China’s family
policy and not merely as part of a routine medical and family
planning policy.” (Id. at 5.) The Board stated that Cheng had
merely shown “an act of resistance and an unconnected
imposition of harm.” (Id.)
A reasonable adjudicator, we conclude, would be
compelled to disagree. As with its persecution analysis, the
BIA’s conclusion that the mistreatment Cheng suffered was
“unconnected” to her defiance of the population control regime
stems from its focus upon the IUD insertion alone without
-42-

regard to the history of mistreatment within which it transpired.
(Id.) Such an analytical error can be significant not just to the
issue of persecution, but also to the nexus prong. As the Second
Circuit has noted, not only is it possible that an “accumulation
of harm from the individual incidents may rise to the level
necessary for persecution even though an individual incident
may not,” but that same accumulation or trajectory of
mistreatment may itself provide circumstantial evidence of the
alleged persecutor’s motive in the absence of direct evidence of
motive or nexus. Manzur, 494 F.3d at 290. As the court went
on to explain:
[T]he motive for the harm inflicted must be
analyzed in light of the context in which the harm
occurred. The pattern provides context for the
petitioners’ claims and may lend evidentiary
support to a conclusion that individual incidents
of harm were in fact “on account of” a ground
protected by the Act . . . .
Id. (quotation marks and internal citation omitted); cf.
Espinosa-Cortez, 607 F.3d at 108-09 (noting that “the INA
makes motive critical,” but an asylum applicant may rely on
circumstantial evidence of the persecutor’s motive, since
“persecutors are hardly likely to submit declarations explaining
exactly what motivated them to act” (quotation marks and
citations omitted)). Put differently, where direct evidence of a
nexus between an act of resistance and an act of mistreatment
(such as IUD insertion) is lacking, the trajectory of abuse may
provide circumstantial evidence of motive, and such a trajectory
must be accounted for in the nexus analysis. See Manzur, 494
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F.3d at 290.
In Cheng’s case, such circumstantial evidence is
unnecessary to establish the nexus between her mistreatment and
her defiance of the family planning policies, because ample
direct evidence, credited in its entirety by the IJ, compels the
conclusion that she was persecuted on account of her resistance.
See Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir.
2010) (“Because the BIA ignored this compelling evidence of
nexus, its conclusion that [petitioner] failed to establish nexus
is not supported by substantial evidence.”). As Cheng correctly
argues, “in every instance that [she] had an opportunity to
comply with family planning officials, she chose to resist.”
(Pet’r Br. 27.) More to the point, the record unequivocally
establishes that in response to each of these acts of resistance,
officials threatened and punished her, and in each instance the
officials expressly linked the sanctions to Cheng’s defiance of
the family planning policies—if Cheng did not agree to have an
abortion, she would lose her job and be forced to terminate her
pregnancy; because Cheng did not terminate her pregnancy,
officials confiscated her family farm and truck and forbade her
from working on the farm; if Cheng did not agree to be
sterilized, her daughter would be taken from her and the
detention of her boyfriend would be prolonged; because Cheng
had an illegitimate child, she was forced to pay social
compensation fees to send her daughter to daycare; and because
Cheng missed gynecological examinations, she was assessed
fines that she could not afford to pay. The IJ found the entirety
of Cheng’s account of these facts credible—as the Board itself
acknowledged, “the facts of this case are not in serious dispute.”
(App. at 5.) In light of this abundance of credible evidence
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expressly linking the mistreatment Cheng suffered to her
resistance to the population control program, we conclude that
“a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled” to reject the
BIA’s characterization of these harms as being unrelated to her
acts of resistance. Toure, 443 F.3d at 316 (quotation marks,
alteration, and citation omitted).
The Board concluded otherwise by treating the IUD
insertion as the only relevant act of mistreatment, apparently
relegating the remainder of Cheng’s experiences to a category
of “aggravating circumstances” that it decided are pertinent only
to the question of whether the IUD insertion itself was
sufficiently harmful to constitute persecution. But the INA calls
for a determination of persecution, not aggravating
circumstances, and, as we have explained, the events underlying
a claim of persecution must be viewed in the aggregate. See,
e.g., Li, 400 F.3d at 169; Manzur, 494 F.3d at 290. Here, with
the arguable exception of the IUD insertion itself, there was an
express, undeniable link between each such event and Cheng’s
resistance to the population control regime. No reasonable
adjudicator could conclude that these events were
“unconnected” to Cheng’s acts of resistance, irrespective of
whether the act of inserting an IUD was a routine family
planning procedure. (App. at 5.) We conclude that these
expressly linked acts of abuse amount to past persecution with
a nexus to Cheng’s resistance, meaning that the Board’s
determination that Cheng failed to satisfy the nexus element of
her other resistance claim is not supported by substantial
evidence.
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IV.
As we have explained, “the undisputed record evidence
compels the conclusion” that Cheng was persecuted on account
of her resistance to China’s coercive population control
policies.15 Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 241, 243 (7th
Cir. 2004). Although we find that the evidence unequivocally
demonstrates that Cheng satisfied the resistance, persecution,
and nexus prongs, the ultimate decision concerning Cheng’s
eligibility for asylum is the agency’s, not ours, to make. See
Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006) (per curiam)
(holding that “the law’s ordinary remand requirement” compels
remand to the agency to make the final decision as to asylum
eligibility); accord I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16
(2002) (per curiam); Ghebremedhin, 392 F.3d at 243
(concluding that “the power to grant asylum is vested solely in
the hands of the Attorney General, and . . . even if an alien is
otherwise eligible, the Attorney General is empowered by statute
to deny relief”) (citations omitted). We therefore grant Cheng’s
petition for review and remand to the BIA for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Because we find that the Board’s decision on past
persecution is not supported by substantial evidence, we need
not address its conclusion regarding the likelihood of future
persecution or its dismissal of Cheng’s claims for withholding
of removal and CAT relief.
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring:
The majority concludes that resistance to a coercive
population control program includes resistance to China’s ban
on procreation by unmarried couples and resistance to the
insertion of an IUD. The majority has remanded this case to
the BIA for reconsideration of the credible evidence of past
persecution, including persecution for resistance to the
insertion of the IUD. I believe, however, that the “resistance”
language of the statute refers only to resistance to abortion or
sterilization. In my opinion, the remand should only consider
resistance to these latter two procedures. For that reason, I
write separately to address the BIA’s interpretation of the
phrase “other resistance to a coercive population control
program.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
Because of the structure of section 1101(a)(42), with
the first two phrases of the sentence referring exclusively to
those individuals who have been forced to undergo abortion
or a sterilization procedure and to individuals who have been
persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure,
I conclude that the third phrase, directed at resistance to a
“coercive population control program” refers to resistance
only to abortion or sterilization procedures, not to resistance
to any method of population control, including, in this
instance, IUD insertion. The courts that have examined this
issue do not agree with me, but I submit that they have
interpreted the statute in the manner that they did because the
petitioners before them had been forced to undergo the
insertion of an IUD and thus the briefing was skewed in that
direction without considering whether it was the correct
direction.
Contrary to the interpretations to date of section
1101(a)(42), I conclude that Congress intended the phrase
“other resistance” to be interpreted as referring to activities of
individuals who are resisting or opposing China’s population
control policy. Such activities and individuals might include,
for example, a doctor’s refusal to perform abortion or
sterilization procedures, a conscientious objector’s circulation
of material supporting the ban of abortion and sterilization
procedures, or an activist’s organization of public

demonstrations
sterilization.

in

opposition

to

forced

abortion

and

If the language of section 1101(a)(42) is interpreted as
encompassing all actions that “thwart the goals of the
[population control] plan and [are] viewed with disfavor by
Chinese officials implementing the plan . . .”, In re M-F-W& L-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 633 (BIA 2008), its scope is too
broad and goes beyond what I find to be Congress’s intent.
Without a narrower interpretation of this phrase, section
1101(a)(42) could be read to apply to any method of birth
control, including, among others, condoms or abstinence.
Such a broad interpretation would effectively “afford a safe
harbor to all those Chinese who chafe under [China’s
population control program].” Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153,
1170 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). This cannot
be what Congress intended. As Judge Kleinfeld commented
in dissent:
[ P u rs u a n t to 8 U .S .C . §
1157(a)(5)], [t]here are only 1,000
asylum spots a year for those
seeking asylum under [8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)], which arguably
extended its succor only to those
most brutalized by Chinese family
policy. By broadening the grant
to those who are most peripheral
to this class . . . we may well be
withdrawing American protection
from those at the heart of it,
persons subjected to forced
abortions and sterilizations. The

2

compassion felt by the majority
risks a cruel irony of denial of
compassion to those who need it
most.
Id. (footnote omitted).

1

For the reasons articulated above, I respectfully
concur.

1

The numerical limitation set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(5) was
repealed in 2005. See Pub.L. 109-13, Div. B, Title I, § 101(g)(2),
May 11, 2005, 119 Stat. 305. The President is now empowered to
set, on an annual basis, “the number of refugees who may be
admitted under [8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)] . . . .” For Fiscal Year 2010,
President Barack Obama determined that no more than 17,000
refugees from East Asia will be granted refugee status. See
Presidential Determination No. 2008-29, Sept. 30, 2008, 73 F.R.
52385. Although the allocation has changed since Judge Kleinfeld’s
dissent was issued, because a limit on the number of refugees that
may be granted asylum still exists, his reasoning supporting a narrow
construction of the phrase “other resistance to a coercive population
control program” remains persuasive.
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